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INTRODUCTION 
All too often the options facing the United States (as well as other 
nations) when it comes to foreign affairs are portrayed as a binary 
choice between unilateralism and multilateralism, between “bowling 
alone” and playing with others.1 Framing the choice this way packs a 
 * Hamilton Fish Professor of Law & Diplomacy, Columbia Law School. This 
is the text of remarks delivered at the American University Washington College of 
Law in September 2008. I am grateful for comments received from Michael Doyle. 
 1. See generally UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES (David M. Malone & Yuen Foong Khong eds., 2003) (exploring the 
effects of the Bush Administration foreign policy of unilateralism); cf. ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
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rhetorically powerful punch—as when former President Bill Clinton 
suggested at the 2008 Democratic Convention that the might of the 
United States rests not on its demonstrable military power but on the 
power of its example (including presumably its adherence to the 
international rule of law).2 The suggestion that committing to 
international law requires ceding the deployment of one’s unilateral 
power in deference to others—that it requires ceding to multilateral 
consent and involves a choice between relying on brute force and 
relying on the rule of law—also haunts international law scholarship. 
Today’s legal academy, particularly in the United States, reflects a 
divide between traditional defenders of international legalism and 
revisionist upstarts who question the efficacy, or at the very least the 
democratic legitimacy, of both global treaties negotiated within 
multilateral institutions and the rules of custom that are backed by 
the international community.3 It is easy to see this academic chasm, 
which has obviously been reflected in the policies adopted by the 
outgoing Bush Administration, as a schism between those who 
believe in international law and those who do not. At the extreme 
end one finds John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United 
Nations, who famously contended that international law does not 
really exist. Bolton stated that while nations might be said to be 
“politically” or “morally” bound to adhere to those international 
agreements to which they have given their consent, they cannot be 
said to be “legally” bound by them because the only real law is 
national law sanctioned by a national constitution such as the United 
States’ Constitution.4 For Bolton, who removed the United States’ 
signature from the International Criminal Court’s Statute in the early 
COMMUNITY (2000) (exploring evidence of declining community participation and 
social interactions by Americans and its impact on the country). 
 2. See Transcript: Bill Clinton’s Convention Speech, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 
27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/us/politics/27text-clinton.html 
(“People the world over have always been more impressed by the power of our 
example than by the example of our power.”). 
 3. For a survey of scholarly views, see José E. Alvarez, The Closing of the 
American Mind, in RECONCILING LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLITICS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 32ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, OTTAWA, OCTOBER 16-18, 2003 
74, 85-86 (John McManus ed., 2004); see also James C. Hathaway, America, 
Defender of Democratic Legitimacy?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 122 (2000) 
(criticizing the United States’ tendency to act unilaterally). 
 4. John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000). 
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days of the current Bush Administration,5 the battle against 
international legalization is about nothing less than protecting the 
United States’ rule of law from encroachment by ersatz multilateral 
rules. 
The view that commitment to international law reflects a binary 
on/off switch is not limited to this side of the Atlantic. Particularly 
since the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, European legal 
scholars have sometimes portrayed the United States as a renegade 
nation bent on defying global norms and threatening to create a 
“lawless world,” whether with respect to the environment, 
international criminal law, humanitarian law, or human rights.6 To 
European critics such as British international lawyer Philippe Sands, 
adherence to international law requires a commitment to multilateral 
action over unilateral action.7 At a conference on unilateralism held 
just prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the 
fundamental divide between the academics present was becoming 
evident. The Europeans (but very few of the Americans) identified 
the legal “obligation to cooperate” as the basis for the post-world war 
international legal order.8 For Europeans like Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 
the presumption deployed in the Lotus Case—the right of a state to 
act alone—has come to be severely conditioned; it has been 
displaced by a “law of coexistence” that, in general, requires states to 
exhaust multilateral remedies before they can legitimately turn to 
unilateral action.9
This dichotomous perspective has considerable evidence to 
support it. Particularly in recent years, the United States has often 
tried to “go it alone,” at the expense of a sincere or credible 
 5. JOHN BOLTON, SURRENDER IS NOT AN OPTION: DEFENDING AMERICA AT 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND ABROAD 85 (2007) (calling his “unsigning” of the 
Rome Statute on behalf of the Bush Administration his “happiest moment at 
State”). 
 6. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICAN AND THE MAKING 
AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR’S ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE 
W. BUSH’S ILLEGAL WAR (2005) (discussing U.S. unilateral policies in violation of 
international law). 
 7. Cf. id. at 174-80 (Criticizing unilateral “anticipatory self-defense”). 
 8. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Place and Role of Unilateralism in 
Contemporary International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 19 (2000) (describing the 
divergent views of the United States on the role of unilateralism in foreign policy). 
 9. Id. at 23-24. 
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commitment to engage in multilateral negotiations.10 The most 
famous example of U.S. unilateralism or exceptionalism is the “Bush 
Doctrine,” that former Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin had 
some trouble identifying in some of her televised interviews.11 The 
Bush Doctrine is the proposition, proclaimed in the U.S. National 
Security Strategy, that the United States can deploy the “pre-
emptive” use of force in response to potential threats to its security, 
even if these threats are uncertain in scope and would not have 
otherwise triggered anticipatory self-defense under customary 
international law.12 This strained effort to re-interpret the terms of 
the U.N. Charter’s ban on the use of military force is not the only 
recent black mark on the United States’ international law record.13 
The United States has also pointedly rejected participation in 
multilateral treaty negotiations on a number of fronts over recent 
years. We have frequently pursued a strategy of acting alone and 
refused to join prominent multilateral treaty regimes—including 
arms control agreements (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban), the 
Kyoto protocol, the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction, numerous International Labor Organizations 
agreements, and global human rights treaties such as the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
and protocol one of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.14 Many international lawyers, including non-European 
 10. See David D. Caron, Between Empire and Community: The United States 
and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
395 (2003) (describing the U.S. trend towards unilateralism during the 
administration of George W. Bush). 
 11. Excerpts: Charlie Gibson Interviews Sarah Palin, ABC NEWS, Sept. 11, 
2008, http://abcnews.go.com/politics/vote2008/story?id=5782924&page=1. See 
also Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1479, 1497-1501 (2003) (discussing the Bush Doctrine). 
 12. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 15-16 (2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf (delineating the Bush Administration’s security policies, 
including preemptive action against emerging threats to the United States). 
 13. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 14. See generally UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 1. 
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lawyers, have echoed the critiques of scholars like Philippe Sands.15 
Many of us have also pointed out that the United States’ war on 
international law has also taken the form of lawless interpretations of 
some of the treaty regimes to which we belong, including the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.16 Even our 
own Supreme Court has suggested that we have severely mangled 
international law, particularly in the course of waging our “war” 
against terror.17 But this view of the plight of contemporary 
international law—and the challenges it faces from states such as the 
United States—over-simplifies the choices countries such as the 
United States face. 
We need to be careful about overstating the case against United 
States unilateralism, not only because of the risk of partisan political 
backlash, but more importantly because the next president cannot 
afford to take such a simple view of the choices this nation and the 
world face. The next administration will necessarily have to engage 
far more than the Bush Administration ever did with international 
law and its institutions. As it does so, it will increasingly find legal 
regimes that are too complex to be reduced to a simple choice 
between unilateralism and multilateralism or the deployment of 
power versus subservience to law. Contemporary international legal 
regimes are not principally about choosing between acting as lawless 
empire or pre-committing oneself to multilateral cooperation. 
I. THE IDEAL OF LAW 
What we increasingly find—in regimes as distinct as those seeking 
to prevent terrorist acts and those governing foreign investment—is a 
turn to what I would call an empire of law. This is not the same as 
either the ideal of the rule of law as portrayed by idealistic 
 15. See, e.g., CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN 
UNILATERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF GOOD INTENTIONS (2003) (criticizing U.S. 
unilateralism and advocating multilateral approaches to confront terrorism and 
other world problems). 
 16. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
175 (2006) (critiquing Bush Administration lawyers’ memoranda justifying 
“enhanced interrogation techniques”). 
 17. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-33 (2006) (holding that trials 
before specially designed military commission violate both U.S. and international 
law). 
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international lawyers or the exercise of hegemonic rule by one 
particular national empire, that is, what some might call the law of 
empire. Nor is it the case that today’s empires of law involve only 
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. 
A. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
For all the attention and proper criticism of the United States’ 
defiance of the international community and the strictures of the 
U.N. Charter in choosing to invade Iraq, it is important to recognize 
just how much even the Bush Administration continued to rely on 
international law and the United Nations in waging its “war” on 
terror and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, even with respect to 
the invasion of Iraq, the lawyers of the U.S. State Department have 
preferred not to rely on the controversial notion of the pre-emptive 
use of force.18 Their case for the legality of that invasion has not 
relied primarily on the Bush Doctrine. The government lawyers 
charged with justifying that invasion have emphasized instead that 
U.S. actions were justified because U.N. Security Council authorized 
the collective use of force against Iraq twelve years earlier in 
Resolution 687. Furthermore, they have noted that Security Council 
members had acquiesced in later U.S. and U.K. military actions to 
enforce the U.N.-authorized “no fly” zones over Iraq.19 Whether or 
not one accepts the contention that the invasion of Iraq was merely 
another step in enforcing the U.N. Security Council’s own terms for 
continuing to deal with a threat to the international peace, these 
arguments by Bush Administration lawyers highlight the fact that 
even after 9/11, Philippe Sands’ “lawless” nation has repeatedly 
turned to the U.N. Security Council and its Chapter VII enforcement 
powers with respect to issues regarding the international law of self-
defense, counter-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the 
occupation of Iraq.20
 18. See, e.g., William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Agora: Future 
Implications of the Iraq Conflict, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 557 (2003) (supporting the United States’ use of military force in Iraq 
largely on the basis of prior Security Council resolutions). 
 19. Id. at 559. 
 20. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Editorial Comment, Hegemonic International 
Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873 (2003) (surveying the normative effects of 
Security Council actions concerning counterterrorism, postconflict Iraq, and self-
defense against the Taliban). 
2009] CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 817 
 
Though today few international lawyers accept the unilateralist 
doctrine of the pre-emptive use of force, far more are willing to 
accept the proposition that the rules governing self defense have been 
subtly changed by the preambles of Security Council Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 and states’ acquiescence in U.S. actions in 
Afghanistan after 9/11.21 These resolutions imply that: 
(1) Terrorist violence, at least when of the scale of the events 
of September 11, 2001, and even when undertaken by a 
nonstate actor, may constitute an “armed attack” for purposes 
of U.N. Charter Article 51. 
(2) A state’s assistance to, harboring of, or post hoc 
ratification of violent acts undertaken by individuals within 
its territory, or perhaps even mere negligence in controlling 
such individuals, may make that state responsible for those 
acts and justify military action against it. In other words, such 
state action (or inaction) may constitute a breach of the state’s 
own duty not to violate U.N. Charter Article 2(4). 
(3) The right to respond with military force against both 
terrorist individuals and harboring states does not become 
impermissible retaliation or illegal anticipatory self-defense, 
or exceed the rules of proportionality, merely because the 
threat of continued terrorist attack remains clandestine and 
unpredictable (as it has been since 9/11).22
The United States, in short, has turned to the United Nations just 
like critics such as Sands would recommend—at least to secure 
multilateral acceptance of its numerous military actions apart from 
those in Iraq.23 It has used international law to justify, and to modify, 
the rules permitting force. 
Further, as its legalist critics have urged, the United States has 
turned to the U.N. Security Council to legalize its efforts to 
criminalize terrorist acts around the world. The U.N. Security 
Council’s law-enforcement efforts to counter terrorism have 
accompanied the United States’ military “war” on terror.24 The 
 21. S.C. Res 1368, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 
1373, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 22. Alvarez, supra note 20, at 879. 
 23. See Richard N. Gardner, Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict, 
Neither Bush Nor the “Jurisprudes”, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 585, 589 (2003). 
 24. See Alvarez, supra note 20, at 874-78 (describing the Security Council’s 
efforts). 
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United States has spearheaded these efforts, but they have been 
pursued under the flag of the United Nations. After 9/11 the U.N. 
Security Council has expanded its efforts to impose “smart 
sanctions” against named terrorists and terrorist organizations.25 The 
Council’s resolutions, subsequent to its original Resolution 1267 that 
first imposed sanctions on persons identified by the Council as 
members of or contributors to Al Queda, created procedures by 
which hundreds of individuals or organizations believed to be 
associated with Al Queda or the Taliban anywhere in the world have 
been denied access to their bank accounts or the right to travel 
overseas.26 Today, a Security Council Sanctions Committee 
implements sanctions similar to those imposed by the U.S. Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, except that the authority for these is not U.S. 
law but the law of the U.N. Charter, specifically the power of 
Council under Chapter VII to undertake enforcement action and to 
do so even if such action would otherwise violate international law.27
Under resolution 1373 the Council has effectively legislated 
portions of the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism.28 In that resolution, the Security Council 
mandated, among other things, that all states must criminalize 
provision of funding to be used for terrorist acts, freeze assets of 
parties who use those assets to commit acts of terrorism, and prohibit 
transfer of terrorist funding. Further, it decided that states must not 
harbor terrorists or those who finance terrorists. must implement 
border controls to prevent migration of terrorist groups, and 
cooperate with one another during investigations of terrorist 
activity.29 Resolution 1373 and its progeny, which established the 
U.N. counter-terrorism committee (“CTC”) to oversee these efforts 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Eric Rosand, Current Developments, The Security Council’s Efforts to 
Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 745 
(2004) (examining the implementation of sanctions against suspected Al Qaeda 
and Taliban members). 
 27. See Financial War on Terrorism: New Money Trails Present Fresh 
Challenges: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong., S. Hrg. 107-880, 
at 42-47 (2002), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/84922.pdf 
(prepared statement of Alan Larson, Under Secretary of State for Economic, 
Business and Agricultural Affairs) (presenting an overview of the U.S. sanctions 
and listing procedures targeted at terrorist finance). 
 28. See Alvarez, supra note 20, at 875. 
 29. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 21, ¶1-2. 
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and provide states with assistance in implementing the Council’s 
legislative demands, is an attempt to establish a fairly comprehensive 
counter-terrorism regime.30 The United States’ role in driving these 
actions was quite evident. As some U.S. officials suggested, the 
Security Council’s efforts appeared to be an attempt to make 
effective at the global level the strictures imposed under the USA 
PATRIOT Act and related U.S. counterterrorism legislation.31
The United States has also turned to the U.N. Security Council for 
help in stemming the threats posed to the world by weapons of mass 
destruction. Under Resolution 1540, the Council established a regime 
comparable to that established under 1373 for counter-terrorism.32 
Under that resolution, the Council, again acting under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter, prohibited all states from providing any support to 
non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire or transport nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons.33 The Council also required states 
to adopt and enforce appropriate laws to advance this aim and to 
enforce measures to establish domestic controls over such 
weapons.34 The Council also established, as it with respect to 
counter-terrorism, a separate committee to provide States with 
assistance in complying with these edicts and to receive state reports 
indicating how states are complying.35
It would also be inaccurate to portray the United States’ 
occupation of Iraq since the war as a unilateral throwback to the days 
of unfettered imperialism. The occupation of Iraq was not untethered 
from international law but was, on the contrary, a product of its 
application. Although the Security Council has avoided suggesting 
that the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq was legal, the Council 
has affirmed the responsibilities of Iraq’s occupiers through 
resolutions 1483 and its progeny.36 The United Nations, through the 
Council, has continued to bless the agreements between Iraqi 
 30. See Eric Rosand, Current Developments, Security Council Resolution 1373, 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 333, 334-35 (2003) (describing the creation of the CTC and how it 
functions). 
 31. See Alvarez, supra note 20, at 875. 
 32. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
 33. Id. ¶ 1. 
 34. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
 35. Id. ¶ 4. 
 36. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 20, at 882-86. 
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authorities and the United States authorizing continued occupation 
by the latter.37 It has also legitimated joint U.S.-Iraqi efforts to 
impose criminal liability on Iraq’s former leaders.38 While the 
convictions and subsequent executions of Iraqi leaders such as 
Saddam Hussein, undertaken without the involvement of the 
International Criminal Court, have drawn their share of critics, it 
would not be accurate to display such efforts as entirely unauthorized 
by the United Nations.39 In addition, while U.S. efforts to impose 
“democracy” on Iraq have also invoked comparisons to an 
“imperial” age long since passed, even these can be connected to 
Council authority. At least during the period prior to installation of 
an Iraqi government, the Security Council also gave the United 
States and the United Kingdom, as occupying powers, implicit 
permission to reform Iraqi institutions to the extent necessary to 
bring about democratic institutions.40 As some commentators have 
suggested, in doing these things the Council may have subtly 
changed the underlying rules of occupation law, under which 
occupiers have been required to be mere caretakers not authorized to 
engage in comprehensive or permanent reforms of the occupied 
country’s institutions.41
It would be relatively easy to praise all of the Council’s efforts as 
the counterpoint to the Bush Administration’s unilateral “war” on 
terror. One could portray all of these as antidotes to the Bush 
Administration’s “lawless” attempts to threaten force preemptively, 
to detain “enemy combatants” without notifying the Red Cross, or to 
question detainees through unlawful “enhanced interrogation 
techniques.”42 It is not hard to describe these Council resolutions as 
 37. S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); see also David 
J. Scheffer, Agora (Continued): Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, Beyond 
Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842 (2003) (describing the U.N. Security 
Council’s actions allowing the U.S. and U.K. to occupy and govern Iraq). 
 38. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 37, pmbl., ¶ 3. 
 39. Cf. José E. Alvarez, Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony, 2 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 319 (2004) (surveying criticisms of the Iraqi Criminal Tribunal 
established in the wake of U.S. occupation). 
 40. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 37, pmbl., ¶ 4 and ¶ 8. 
 41. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 37, at 844-45. 
 42. See Scott Shane, David Johnston, & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement 
of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1 (reporting that U.S. 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez approved the harsh interrogation techniques 
despite criticism). 
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attempts to use the U.N. Charter’s collective security arm as 
intended, no less so than the Council resolutions leading to the first 
invasion of Iraq, namely the first President Bush’s Gulf War.43 That 
earlier Council effort has been widely praised in the scholarly 
literature as an exemplar of the U.N. Charter working as the 
collective security mechanism that it was intended to be.44 Like 
Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force by those acting to 
defend Kuwait, the Council’s efforts in Resolutions 1373, 1540, 
1267, and 1428 are no less products of the rule of law. They too are 
Chapter VII actions duly authorized by the Charter. They too are the 
products of the Council’s ability to proclaim a “threat to the peace” 
as it sees fit (pursuant to article 39 of the U.N. Charter) and the 
authority under the Charter enabling the Council to take any and all 
measures (including actions that impact directly on individuals) 
under articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter.45 Further, the Council is 
specifically authorized under article 103 of the Charter to override 
members’ existing treaty obligations as necessary to implement its 
collective enforcement sanctions.46 Thus, the Council’s actions seem 
to be the embodiment of the international rule of law and the United 
Nations working as intended: an explicit abdication by the “hyper-
power” of the temptation to exert its considerable powers extra-
legally. 
B. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
The United States’ turn to international investment treaties is 
another progressive example of the United States’ turn to legalism 
over the sheer deployment of power. In the days of formal empire, 
the United States, like other colonial powers, sometimes threatened 
“gunboat diplomacy” to defend the rights of its private foreign 
 43. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
 44. See generally Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in 
International and Foreign Relations Law, U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War: “The 
Old Order Changeth”, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 63, 63 (1991). 
 45. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42; see generally Paul C. Szasz, Notes and 
Comments, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 
(2002). 
 46. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 748, ¶ 17-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) 
(imposing aviation sanctions on Libya notwithstanding pre-existing treaties 
guaranteeing Libya landing rights). 
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investors overseas.47 Today, U.S. foreign investors are more likely to 
be protected by international investment treaties and not by lawless 
threats, nor even by the United States threatening to apply unilateral 
economic sanctions against an expropriating state (as under the 
United States’ Hickenlooper Amendment).48 U.S. and other foreign 
investors today are protected by an intricate web of nearly 3,000 
bilateral or regional investment protection treaties.49 These treaties 
generally contain assurances that once admitted, foreign investors:  
(1) will receive trade treatment equal to that which the host state 
gives to any other foreign investor (“most favored nation” status) or 
the treatment it accords its own investors (national treatment);  
(2) will receive “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection 
and security” in accordance with international law; (3) will be able to 
transfer profits and other capital out of the country without 
unreasonable currency restrictions; and 4) will receive prompt, 
adequate and fair compensation if expropriated directly or 
indirectly.50 Many investment agreements also provide that foreign 
investors from either state party will be able to forego local courts 
and have direct access to international binding arbitration to resolve 
alleged treaty violations by host states.51 This means that unlike most 
international legal regimes, the investment regime grants its non-
 47. See Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute 
Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 BYU L. 
REV. 527, 529-31 (2002). 
 48. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (West 2004). The Hickenlooper Amendment cuts 
off U.S. foreign assistance to countries that expropriate the property of U.S. 
citizens. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
473 (2002) (marking the explosion of U.S. bilateral investment treaties over recent 
years). 
 49. See, e.g., Lisa Sachs & Karl Sauvant, BITs, DITs and FDI Flows: An 
Overview, in THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND DOUBLE 
TAXATION TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS (Jeffrey Sachs ed., 
2009); José E. Alvarez, The Evolving Foreign Investment Regime, IL.POST, Feb. 
29, 2008, http://www.asil.org/ilpost/president/ pres080229.html (stating that nearly 
every member of these treaties has some obligation to give foreign investors most 
favored nation treatment and to protect investors from harms caused by investment 
contract breaches or customary international law). 
 50. R. DOAK BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD, & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 1007-1169 (2005) 
(considering arbitral caselaw interpreting these rights). 
 51. See id. at 1009 (noting that some arbitration agreements require, however, 
that the case first be submitted to the host’s local courts, but that if the case is not 
resolved after 18 months then the investor has recourse in international arbitration). 
2009] CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 823 
 
state beneficiaries directly enforceable rights at the international 
level. The investment regime is enforced by the thousands of foreign 
investors, principally multinational enterprises with the wherewithal 
to invest overseas and to protect their financial interests when these 
are threatened through international arbitration. Foreign investors 
themselves serve as the private attorneys general to enforce and 
enable ongoing interpretation of international investment law.52 The 
growing body of arbitral international investment case law is 
therefore as much their creation as it is of the states that enter into 
investment treaties. 
The United States exerted considerable leadership in the creation 
of this international investment regime.53 While the United States 
was not the first Western country to establish bilateral investment 
treaties (“BITs”), its first BITs were among the most investor-
protective ever devised, as was the investment chapter of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).54 The investor-state 
claims brought pursuant to the NAFTA by North American law firms 
have encouraged foreign investors around the world to seek recourse 
through International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”) arbitration and have helped to spur the growing 
movement to investor-state arbitration under other mechanisms, such 
as ICSID’s Additional Facility and the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).55 The United States, 
the country that has been for a considerable period of time the home 
to the leading foreign investors of the world, has led in establishing 
the contemporary international investment regime. The United States 
also has been highly influential with respect to many other actions by 
international organizations that complement the investment regime, 
such as efforts by the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the 
World Bank, and regional development banks to impose “good
 52. See LOWENFELD, supra note 48, at 485, 493 (explaining the important 
contribution investors play in arbitration and dispute resolution which contributes 
to the corpus of international law). 
 53. See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE 20-1 (1992). 
 54. See generally, José E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303 
(1996-97). 
 55. See, e.g., Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 49, at xxxviii-xli. 
824 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:811 
 
governance” standards on states that complement the rights granted 
foreign investors in investment agreements.56
III. COUNTER-NARRATIVE: LAW OF EMPIRE 
Not all international lawyers have accepted the binary description 
of law/non-law, unilateral/multilateral actions discussed earlier. 
Others, especially those who consider themselves members of 
critical legal studies movements, argue that these regimes merely 
legalize rule by the powerful, and especially by the United States and 
its closest Western allies. “Crits,” especially those who consider 
themselves part of the Third World Approaches to International Law 
(“TWAIL”) academic genre, argue that the legal regimes discussed 
infra constitute contemporary forms of neocolonialism.57 For current 
critics of international law—such as Makua Matua, Ugo Mattei, or 
B.S. Chimni—these U.S.-backed international law regimes do not 
represent the neutral law among sovereign equals favored by 
international idealists, but law imposed by and at the service of the 
world’s hegemon or hegemons.58 Orders by the Security Council, the 
dictates of the IMF, or the rules of investment treaties are, from the 
critical perspective, nothing more than U.S. imperial ambitions 
“laundered” by law—whether “blue-washed” through the (mis)use of 
the United Nations or international financial institutions or imposed 
on the unwilling through unequal bilateral treaties.59 American 
University’s Washington College of Law has helped to popularize 
 56. See generally Daniel Kalderimis, IMF Confidentiality as Investment 
Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis, 13 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 103 (2004); David P. 
Fidler, A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural 
Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization, 35 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 387 (2000). 
 57. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Newness, Imperialism, and International 
Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 171 
(2005) (surveying TWAIL literature). 
 58. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. 
Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003) 
(describing the new forms of “imperial” international law dominated by a few 
hegemonic players); B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial 
Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (semble); Makau Mutua, 
Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider, 45 
VILL. L. REV. 841 (2000) (arguing that current international law is a reflection of 
Eurocentric preoccupations). 
 59. See generally LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND 
THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2000). 
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the view that much of contemporary international law seeks to 
implement the “Washington consensus”60 on how all states are 
supposed to behave—whether with respect to the threat of terrorism 
or foreign investors. The Grotius lectures that the Washington 
College of Law has generously sponsored in recent annual meetings 
of the American Society of International Law have provocatively 
raised the profile of such views.61
A. THE SECURITY COUNCIL: LEGISLATING HEGEMONY 
As my own work depicting recent Security Council actions as 
manifestations of “hegemonic international law” suggests,62 this rival 
description of contemporary international law has considerable merit. 
Although, as noted above, it is easy to portray the Council 
resolutions surveyed above as examples of the U.N. Charter working 
as intended, it is also easy to suggest the opposite. Security Council 
resolutions like 1373 and 1540, which purport to bind all states 
subject to no geographic or temporal limitation, can be seen as 
constituting an unprecedented and unwarranted “legislative” or even 
“constitutional” turn for an organ originally intended to serve only as 
collective enforcer of the peace, not global lawmaker.63 By using its 
political leverage on the Council, the United States has managed on 
these occasions to circumvent the “vehicle par excellence of 
community interest,” namely the negotiation of a multilateral treaty, 
and has opted instead to use an unaccountable global law-maker 
subject to its veto power.64
Security Council law-making also has peculiar characteristics not 
shared by much of international law. In Resolution 1373, for 
example, the Council selected only some provisions of a recently 
 60. See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reforms, in 
LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7-8 (John 
Williamson ed., 1990) (including in the “Washington consensus” political 
branches, international financial institutions, economic agencies, and think tanks). 
 61. See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, A Just World Under Law: A View from the South, 22 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 199 (2007) (The Eighth Annual Grotius Lecture presented at 
the 100th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law). 
 62. Alvarez, supra note 20. 
 63. See generally Jena L. Cohen, A Global State of Emergency or the Further 
Constitutionalization of International Law: A Pluralist Approach, 15 
CONSTELLATIONS 456 (2008). 
 64. Alvarez, supra note 20, at 875 (quoting Bruno Simma). 
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concluded (and therefore not widely ratified) Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, added provisions that do 
not appear in that treaty (because they did not win favor at the 
multilateral level), and omitted those provisions which it did not like, 
including the Convention’s explicit deference to other requirements 
of international law. These include the due process rights of persons 
charged with terrorism-related offences, the rights of extradited 
persons, and the treaty’s provisions envisioning judicial review.65 
Further, unlike most efforts to implement global rules within the 
United Nations, the Council’s 1373 and 1540 regimes rely on groups 
of experts not chosen on the basis of geographic representation but 
dominated by experts from the United States and United Kingdom.66 
This effort at “imperial” law relies less on an “independent 
international civil service” than do most efforts by international 
organizations. And the fact that the Security Council’s efforts under 
its resolution 1267, which imposes direct sanctions on individuals, 
are no less respectful of due process rights than is U.S. national law 
with respect to “enemy combatants” captured in the United States’ 
war on terror does not reflect positively on the Council.67
These critiques are valuable insofar as they remind us that the turn 
to multilateralism, or at least to those multilateral institutions 
established after the second World War, is no guarantee that the ideal 
of the rule of law will be satisfied. As Lloyd Gruber reminds us, the 
IMF’s harsh conditionality policies are no less unfair or inequitable 
merely because they come from a multilateral institution.68
B. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
It is even easier to brand the international investment regime, 
largely built on BITs, as tools of empire. BITs are comparable to the 
capitulation agreements that Western powers once extracted from the 
periphery in the nineteenth century.69 Under such agreements, 
 65. Id. at 876.  
 66. See id. (noting that other members do not have the power and resources to 
object to the U.S. and U.K. dominance). 
 67. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. 00 
(critically examining the legality of European legislation implementing the 
Security Council’s counterterrorism sanctions). 
 68. See GRUBER, supra note 59, at 55 (noting government leaders’ attempts to 
blame the IMF for hardships imposed under IMF conditionality). 
 69. See generally Fidler, supra note 56. 
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Western colonial powers gained extraterritorial jurisdiction in the 
territories of non-Western countries by exempting Western nationals 
(including Western merchants and investors) from local law. These 
capitulation agreements imposed the “standard of civilization” on the 
“uncivilized” by granting jurisdiction over Western nationals and 
their property to consular officials of the Western states in lieu of 
local courts.70 Western states justified these treaties on the premise 
that poor host states of foreign traders and investors were incapable 
of satisfying the standard of justice granted by “civilized nations.”71 
Like old capitulation agreements, present day BITs also exempt 
foreign investors from having to go to local courts. They merely 
substitute international arbitral mechanisms for the former’s recourse 
to consular officials. Further, while investment agreements are 
formally the product of mutual state consent, the consent by LDCs to 
terms that are extremely favorable to foreign investors largely from 
the West has been heavily constrained by the dictates of the market 
as well as the privatization and other demands extracted by 
institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.72
IV. THE COMPLEXITY OF CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
This alternative critical description of international legal regimes, 
however, is something of a caricature despite its merits. Efforts to 
characterize contemporary legal regimes in the Security Council or 
under BITs as manifestations of either the ideal of law or the “law of 
empire” are unduly simplistic. Closer attention to the actual 
operation of such regimes reveals that these regimes are subject to 
counter-veiling forces that make them both hegemonic and lawful. 
They are more accurately seen not as the law of empire but as 
empires of law. 
 70. See id. at 391-92. 
 71. See id. at 392. 
 72. Cf. id. at 404 (explaining that while international law is still an exercise in 
hegemonic power, the global economic and political fallout from the Cold War 
enabled policy and legal reform in developing countries by the IMF and World 
Bank). 
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A. THE BACKLASH AGAINST THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Consider what has happened even in the brief time since 9/11 
under the Security Council regimes surveyed above. The United 
States’ resort to the Security Council to legitimate its use of force in 
the wake of 9/11 resulted in consequences for the United States, as 
well as for others and for the resulting law. The U.S. officials who 
opted to turn to the Council had not anticipated all of these 
consequences. While the Security Council’s acquiescence in military 
action in Afghanistan has gone some way towards modifying the 
underlying rules governing self defense, the law has not moved 
towards accepting the preemptive use of force. As Ian Hurd has 
argued, the justificatory legal discourse required of any state going to 
the Council initially forced the United States to try to justify its 
invasion of Iraq by asserting the existence of weapons of mass 
destruction. The subsequent absence of such weapons imposed a 
substantial cost on the United States in terms of lost allies.73 The 
Council’s failure to approve the U.S. invasion has arguably held the 
line on the United States’ most far-reaching attempts to deviate from 
the traditional rules governing the use of force. Similarly, the United 
States’ recourse to the Council to justify its occupation has imposed 
constraints on U.S. actions, among them, the fact that a continued 
U.S. presence in Iraq remains contingent on Iraqi acquiescence and 
subsequent approval by the Security Council.74
Considerable push-back by states and NGOs objecting to 
“legislative” efforts by the Council has also accompanied the 
Council’s efforts on counterterrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction.75 As Ian Johnstone and others have noted, supporters of 
 73. IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2007); see also Ian Hurd, The Strategic Use of 
Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the U.N. Sanctions, 1992-2003, 59 INT’L ORG. 
501 (2005) (explaining how legitimacy may be lost if the hegemon is too often 
seen as itself violating the rules of the game). 
 74. See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder: U.S. Security 
Agreements and Iraq, Dec. 23, 2008 (examining the agreements that have 
determined the legality of the continued U.S. presence in Iraq as supervised by the 
Security Council), available at http://www.cf.org/publication/16448/.  
 75. See, e.g., Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1363 (2001) and Extended by Resolution 1390 (2002), Second Report 
of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
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resolution 1373 over time have had to devote much greater efforts to 
securing implementation with counter-terrorism measures through 
deliberative discourse less reliant on top-down Council fiat.76 There 
have been greater efforts to justify the merits of the underlying 
measures, greater efforts to make the operation of relevant Council 
committees more transparent, and a shift to more accountable forms 
of implementation.77 In 2005, for example, the CTC was made 
subject to the direction of a larger body, the Counter-terrorism 
Directorate (“CTED”).78 Although U.S. officials sought to have the 
CTED report solely to the CTC, resistance by other states led to a 
compromise whereby the U.N. Secretary-General would appoint its 
executive director.79 Suggestions that the goal of resolution 1373 was 
to secure global dissemination of the USA PATRIOT Act have been 
quietly shelved amidst growing agreement that the best way to secure 
effective counter-terrorism cooperation involves persuading, not 
forcing, states to comply. In addition, there has been a more serious 
complementary effort within the General Assembly to come up with 
a multilateral convention which, unlike the Council’s more 
hegemonic efforts, actually defines what “terrorism” is.80 Even the 
United States deems this necessary to stem the opportunism that 
counterterrorism Security Council ‘legislation’ without benefit of 
definition engenders.81
1363 (2001) and Extended by Resolution 1390 (2002), U.N. Doc. S/2002/1050 
(Sept. 20, 2002) (noting that some states have failed to take measure because of the 
lack of legislative authority to do so); Per Cramér, Recent Swedish Experience with 
Targeted U.N. Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in the Security Council, in REVIEW 
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER STATES 85, 105 (Erika de Wet et al. eds., 
2003) (examining the difficulties Sweden encountered in implementing Security 
Council issued sanctions that were in apparent contradiction of individuals’ 
fundamental rights). 
 76. See Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the U.N. Security 
Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 276 
(2008) (contending that public policy decisions are best made when accompanied 
by reasoned argumentation). 
 77. Id. at 288-89. 
 78. See id. at 285 (noting that the CTED comprised 20 experts in charge of 
helping the CTC make policy and strategic decisions). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 288-89; ERIC ROSAND, ALISTAIR MILLAR & JASON IPE, THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL’S COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM: WHAT LIES AHEAD? (Oct. 
2007). 
 81. Cf. Human Rights Watch, Current Events, Opportunism in the Face of 
Tragedy: Repression in the Name of Anti-Terrorism, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/ 
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There has been even greater member push-back with respect to the 
smart counterterrorism sanctions imposed under 1267 and 
subsequent resolutions. Members quickly objected to how this 
regime operated and challenges soon emerged in national courts, the 
European Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of 
Justice.82 Political pressures from states objecting to the listing of 
their nationals have forced changes in the way the Sanctions 
Committee operates. While initially individuals were listed (largely 
at the behest of intelligence experts from the United States and the 
United Kingdom) based on political trust, there were no procedures 
for removing persons from the sanctions list once listed and there 
were no exceptions identified for enabling targeted individuals to 
have access to some money to meet their daily needs for shelter and 
food. The U.N. sanctions committee was forced to change its 
procedures.83 Under European pressure, that committee was 
compelled to identify formal guidelines or evidentiary standards for 
states to follow in proposing names, and to incorporate humanitarian 
exceptions and a de-listing procedure.84
But these positive steps to enhance the counterterrorism regime’s 
transparency and legitimacy were insufficient to prevent the 
culmination of challenges before international dispute settlers. After 
a number of predictable judicial determinations in both national 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights that binding Council 
actions could not be judicially reviewed or challenged, in 2008 a 
grand chamber of the European Court of Justice finally held in Kadi 
v. Council of the European Union that the council’s targeted 
sanctions as implemented under European community law could not 
be sustained.85 The Court refused to find that it was unable to engage 
in judicial review of the legality of the sanctions as applied to 
individuals living within the European Union and refused to find that 
campaigns/september11/opportunismwatch.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); 
William Orme, Response to Terror: U.N. Fears Abuses of Terror Mandate, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, at A1 (presenting examples of governments restricting 
freedoms under the pretense of fighting terrorism). 
 82. See, e.g., Kadi v. Council, supra note 67; Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 109; Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. II-2139; Case T-
306/01, Yusuf v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533. 
 83. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1730, ¶¶ 1-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006) 
(outlining the new de-listing procedure). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. at ¶ 61. 
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the primacy of Security Council actions could prevent an inquiry into 
whether the underlying sanctions were consistent with the 
fundamental rights granted to individuals under European law.86 The 
court went on to find the de-listing procedures provided by the U.N. 
Security Council fell short of respecting the rights of European 
nationals to assert their own rights during a relevant proceeding 
because the de-listing procedures were only “diplomatic and 
intergovernmental.” The Court noted that the procedures also failed 
to provide access to the reasons and evidence justifying one’s 
appearance on the list of sanctioned individuals, and therefore 
prevented the opportunity for that individual to present a defense and 
receive an effective legal remedy.87 Despite the fact that the U.N. 
sanctions were stated to be “temporary,” the Court found that the 
European regulation implementing them was a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference with the individual’s property right under 
European law and the European Convention on Human Rights.88 
Accordingly, the Court annulled the regulation as applied to the 
applicants before it but permitted it to be maintained for three 
months to allow the European Council to remedy the flaws that it 
found with respect to procedures.89
Whatever is the final outcome of that particular case, the question 
of how to adjust the U.N. Security Council’s counterterrorism 
sanctions regime to make it more compatible with international 
human rights is an issue that both the European Council and the U.N. 
Security Council will eventually need to resolve. Otherwise the 
legitimacy and possibly the legality of the counterterrorism sanctions 
regime of the United Nations will continue to be in doubt. 
These examples suggest how contemporary international law sets 
limits when powerful states try to use the rule of law or multilateral 
institutions, even in institutions in which the powerful states hold a 
veto, to advance the law of empire. The Security Council’s efforts 
are not quite the same as actions taken by the United States on its 
own. Even the Council must comport its legislative actions with the 
expectations of the international community and with the rest of 
international law. As the Kadi decision suggests, these limits arise 
 86. Id. ¶¶ 283-299. 
 87. Id. ¶¶ 323-326. 
 88. Id. ¶¶ 369-371. 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 372-376. 
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because the U.N. Security Council’s actions now exist within an 
inescapable larger web of international law and institutions, 
including a myriad of international courts. 
B. CONSTRAINT OF EMPIRE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
But as the example of the international investment regime 
addressed infra suggests, the law of empire is necessarily constrained 
as well even when multilateral institutions are not as involved in 
their elaboration or enforcement. In other cases, constraints re-
emerge to the extent that law—even hegemonic law—remains 
grounded in reciprocal application. 
The contention that the international investment regime is 
comparable to nineteenth century capitulation agreements ignores the 
fact that today’s flows of investment are not merely in one direction, 
from north to south. At the moment, the United States is both the 
world’s leading exporter of capital flows and its leading recipient of 
foreign investment capital.90 We share this duality with others, such 
as Brazil, Russia, India and China (abbreviated to “BRICs”), all of 
which are also leading recipients and exporters of capital.91 Of the 
net stock of foreign direct investment capital, approximately 
seventeen percent of it consists of outward FDI flows from emerging 
markets.92 It is no longer accurate to portray the international legal 
regime governing foreign regime as strictly concerned with 
protecting capital from the West as it goes to the rest. 
What this means is that the United States has developed, 
particularly over recent years, the same love-hate relationship when 
it comes to foreign investment as have many other countries. The 
United States, along with virtually all countries (including 
communist holdovers such as Cuba) are now firm converts to David 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage.93 This is clearly 
 90. See ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO 
2011: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL RISK 
(2007), available at http://vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/WorldInvestment 
Prospectsto2011.pdf. 
 91. See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 49, at xxxii. 
 92. Id.  
 93. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 
(Everyman’s Library No. 590, Ernest Rhys ed., 1911). See generally Alan O. 
Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International 
Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (1998) (providing an introduction to and 
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evidenced by the fact that over the course of recent years, nearly all 
countries around the world have modified their national laws to make 
it easier for foreign investors to enter and operate in their 
territories.94 Virtually all nations now regard free capital flows as 
indispensable for economic growth. At the same time, the United 
States shares fears with most countries, including LDCs, about 
whether granting reciprocal rights to all investors will interfere with 
sovereign prerogatives or result in challenges to national law.95 
Foreign takeovers of U.S. companies, including former public 
utilities, remain a flash point of debate over the power of sovereigns 
to influence employment, control national security, preserve local 
jobs and prevent outsourcing, encourage technological innovation, 
and protect intellectual property or national security.96
Comparing provisions of the 1984 Model U.S. BIT with the 
provisions that appear in the latest U.S. Model text suggests what the 
United States’ twenty years of experience with investment treaties, 
including over ten as a defendant under NAFTA in cases brought by 
Canadian investors in the United States challenging U.S. federal and 
state laws under the vague open ended guarantees under the 1984 
treaty, has wrought.97 Over time, the U.S. government has become 
more reticent about protecting the rights of foreign investors at the 
expense of the sovereign prerogatives of the United States. Today’s 
U.S. Model BIT is more than twice as long as it once was.98 It has 
become a longer document in order to better protect the sovereign or 
regulatory rights that the United States once ridiculed when it was 
fighting the proposed “New International Economic Order” once 
advocated by LDCs.99 The text of its most recent Model BIT reflects 
overview of comparative advantage). 
 94. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 90, at 67 (noting that out of 2,394 
changes in national FDI laws between 1991 and 2005, 92% were in the direction of 
creating a more favorable climate for foreign investors). 
 95. Cf. id. at 11, 12-13 (arguing that a rise in protectionism among states is 
hampering foreign direct investment, namely mergers and acquisitions). 
 96. See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 49, at tbd. 
  97. For a table comparing the respective texts of the U.S. Model BITs of 1984 
and 2004, see José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT (forthcoming Transnational 
Dispute Management 2009).  
  98. For the text of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, see http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_ 
Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/Section_Index.html.  
 99. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), pmbl., ¶ 3, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(Dec. 12, 1974) (promoting an economic order “based on equity, sovereign 
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a U.S. government that has faced investor claims under the NAFTA 
challenging California’s rights to protect its ground water as a 
violation of the overly broad guarantees of fair and equitable 
treatment100 and asserting that a Mississippi jury award of punitive 
damages against a Canadian investor constituted an illegal taking of 
property.101 The newly hedged BIT language also reflects awareness 
of ICSID decisions interpreting the U.S.-Argentina BIT that have 
found Argentina liable for millions of dollars in damages resulting 
from harms inflicted on foreign investors as a result of general 
measures that Argentina took in response to a serious economic and 
political crisis.102
The new language of U.S. BITs recalibrates the balance between 
the rights accorded investors and a nation’s right to regulate in the 
public interest in a number of ways. Under the new Model BIT, the 
United States has restricted the definition of the fair and equitable 
guarantee, suggesting that it only embraces traditional protections 
under customary international law.103 While that guarantee still 
covers incidents of maltreatment by national courts, it limits investor 
protections to egregious acts involving basic violations of due 
process.104 The new U.S. language on expropriation restricts the 
meaning of “indirect” takings to violations that would be recognized 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the classic takings case, Penn 
Central.105 Takings jurisprudence should recognize the elements 
equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States, 
irrespective of their economic and social systems”). 
 100. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., (Can. v. U.S.), pt. II, ch. D, 8-9, 44 I.L.M. 1345 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/ 
USA/Methanex/Methanex_Final_Award.pdf (finding that the court had no 
jurisdiction over a suit by Methanex against the United States alleging violation of 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11). 
 101. The Loewen Group, Inc. et al. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,  
¶¶92-95, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003) (rejecting a NAFTA chapter 11 action alleging 
violation by the United States after an allegedly unfair trial). 
 102. See generally José E. Alvarez, and Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis 
and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, Yrbk 
International Investment Law & Policy 379 (2008-09). 
 103. See U.S. Model BIT of 2004, supra note 98, at Art. 5 and annex A. 
 104. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 5, ¶¶ 1-3, annex A, Apr. 4, 2006, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
109-9 [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay Treaty]. 
 105. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., et al. v. New York City, et al., 438 U.S. 104 
(1978), U.S-Uruguay Treaty, supra note 104, annex B (using the analysis of 
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contained in annex B(4) in the U.S.-Uruguay BIT as the balancing 
factors identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in that Penn Central.106 
Moreover, the new U.S. language with respect to the measures that 
“it considers necessary” for the protection of its essential security 
suggests an attempt to make that clause essentially self-judging. 
Thus, international arbitrators cannot second-guess a state’s 
determination that a measure that harms a foreign investor is needed 
to protect that state’s own determination of the state’s “essential 
security.”107 The changes that the U.S. has made to its investment 
treaty bring the property protections granted in those agreements 
closer to the way property rights are recognized and protected in the 
European Convention on Human Rights.108
The changes to the U.S. BIT program over the course of twenty 
years demonstrate that the investment regime can no longer be 
caricatured as law designed only to protect the capital interests of the 
metropole. They show that today’s investment agreements, or at least 
those concluded by the erstwhile leader of the investment regime, are 
not quite like colonial era capitulation treaties. Today’s BITs bite the 
metropole back. As the U.S. changes to its most recent BITs suggest, 
the metropole is occasionally chafing under the regime’s reciprocal 
constraints. And yet the fact that both rich states like the United 
States and LDCs continue to accept the general premises of the 
investment regime and ticker only around the edges of its investor 
protections suggests the extent to which states still consider that 
takings found in the Supreme Court’s decision of Penn Central, to limit the 
definition of indirect expropriation). 
 106. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 107. See U.S.-Uruguay Treaty, supra note 104, art. 18, ¶ 2 (“Nothing in this 
treaty shall be construed . . . to preclude a Party from applying measures that it 
considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of 
its own essential security interests.”). For consideration of the significance of this 
change, see generally Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 102. 
 108. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (“Every natural or 
legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall 
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law. The 
preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.”). 
836 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:811 
 
regime to be in their interests. States’ continued reliance on 
international investment treaties indicates the degree to which all 
states have now bought into the premise that liberal capital flows 
provide mutual benefit. Most states do not see their investment 
agreements as a zero-sum game like a capitulation agreement. Most 
states continue to believe that the mutual flow of capital raises all 
boats. Today, when 27 percent of the BITs are between developing 
countries109 and a considerable portion of capital flows are going to 
the West as well as coming from the East, it is less plausible to 
describe investment agreements as one-sided tools of the West. Nor 
are the countries such as China and Egypt who are signing such 
agreements to protect their foreign investors easily characterized as 
agents of Anglo-American empire.110 Today’s global regime for 
investment is not simply a product of treaties imposed through 
bilateral assertions of power by the rich West against the rest. 
V. A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH TO 
UNDERSTANDING “EMPIRE” 
Describing the essence of complex regimes, whether they are led 
by the U.N. Security Council or formed by bilateral investment 
treaties, is a challenge. We need a description that recognizes that 
what we now have is different from prior empires that were 
territorially based or were essentially the product of one state’s 
power writ large. While these regimes remain tools of empire, we 
need to recognize that the meaning of “empire” is now distinct from 
what it was in the colonial age. These contemporary legal regimes 
exist in a realm beyond statehood, a place where the categories of 
imperialized periphery and exploitative metropole blur. 
 109. See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 49, at xxxiv. 
 110. See id. fig. 8, at xxv (indicating that China (119 BITs) and Egypt (100) are 
among the ten countries with the largest number of BITs as of June 2007; the 
United States is not among the top ten BIT signatories). Cf. WALTER RUSSELL 
MEAD, GOD AND GOLD: BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
WORLD (2007) (describing how the English speaking powers have shaped the 
modern world). 
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A. ANCIENT EMPIRE 
In ancient usage, an imperium was universal by definition.111 
Ancient empires saw themselves as all-encompassing. An empire 
was a harmonious and autonomous cosmos confronted otherwise 
only by chaos.112 Those who stayed outside its domain were 
uncivilized savages. In ancient times, true “empires” aspired to 
universality. 
The Athenian Empire which began roughly in 478 BC and 
collapsed in 405 B.C. is particularly interesting. That empire 
emerged from an alliance among Hellenic states against the 
Persians.113 In 454 B.C. Athens reorganized the alliance, the Delian 
League, and established a joint treasury at Delos which collected 
contributions from the allies.114 Under Athenian leadership, the 
independent states sent representatives to a temple at Delos where 
decisions were taken in a general congress. The Delian League came 
to include captured cities (whose populations were enslaved and the 
land colonized by Athenians) and members of the League who had 
once rebelled and were compelled back into it and forced to give 
tribute. As Michael Doyle has described it, “the Delian League thus 
became an empire in which Athens exercised imperial control largely 
by informal means.”115
This regime was sustained by “allies of the tribute-paying class,” 
each of which had a “.legally independent, formally sovereign 
government, including a democratic assembly.”116 The Delian 
League was also sustained by periodic military interventions and by 
the voluntary acquiescence of the populations and elites of the 
periphery—who sometimes feared, hated, or revered Athens but 
which were generally aware that integration into the League 
conferred concrete economic benefits, including access to the 
 111. STEPHEN HOWE, EMPIRE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 13-14 (2002) 
(explaining that imperium, the predecessor of the word “empire,” meant rule over 
wide territories to which no other monarch could claim title). 
 112. Id. at 14 (asserting that the Greeks created, and the Romans espoused, the 
idea that groups outside the empire were barbarians). 
 113. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 54-81 (1986). 
 114. Id. at 55. 
 115. Id. at 56. 
 116. Id. 
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Athenian market, the protection of Athens from piracy, and other 
imperially provided “collective goods.”117 Unlike Sparta’s 
hegemonic alliance, the Peloponnesian League (which only 
controlled the foreign relations of its allies), Athens was more 
ambitious. It collected tribute, imposed the jurisdiction of its courts, 
regulated the commerce of its subject allies, and sought to impose a 
“democratic” form of government over indigenous traditions of 
government.118 As Doyle tells the story, the brief Athenian empire 
was driven by concerns for security, material self interest (including 
the need to maintain open sea lanes and trade), and self-confidence in 
spreading the Athenian way of life.119
B. THE MODERN EMPIRE OF LAW 
There are obvious parallels between the Athenian League, today’s 
United States, and today’s regimes for collective security and the 
regulation of foreign investment. The Athenian example suggests 
that empire can be built by a “adventurous”120 and proud democratic 
society intent on spreading its democratic way of life to others; that 
empire can be grounded on conceptions of the market, private 
property, liberalized free trade among what we would today call 
nation states, and it that can spread through the rule of law applied 
extraterritorially. But it also suggests that an empire built on trade 
can still have an impact on the periphery’s foreign and domestic 
affairs. At the same time, as the previous discussion of the U.N. 
Security Council and investment regimes demonstrate, it is not 
entirely right to describe these regimes as mere passive conduits for 
imposing U.S. views on others. Such an interpretation fails to 
acknowledge a principal source of the legitimacy and power of these 
regimes. 
As the example of ancient empires illustrates, some “empires” can 
be based on universalistic ideals, including universal rules of law. 
The Delian League example demonstrates that there can be such a 
thing as an “empire of legal rules” that is distinguishable from or at 
 117. Id. at 56-57. 
 118. Id. at 59. 
 119. Id. at 61-63. 
 120. Id. at 65 (defining the adventurous spirit of Athens as “an attitude of mind 
and a repertory of actions which together create a distinctive way of life”). 
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least not identical to rule by imperialist territorial colonial empire.121 
Modern regimes for counter-terrorism and for the regulation of 
investment, like much else in contemporary international law, share a 
number of characteristics with Athenian empire. Today’s legalistic 
methods enable the exercise of indirect hegemonic power. Powerful 
states such as the United States can still get their way but may 
sometimes achieve their goals through the legitimation processes 
provided by multilateral institutions or through recourse to the 
“traditional” pedigreed sources of international law, such as treaties. 
Still, the effects of indirect empire can be, like those of Athens, 
pervasive. Possibly because their hegemonic impact is indirect, 
today’s international legal regimes can penetrate more deeply into 
the foreign and domestic policies of states than could the direct top-
down rules of colonial empire, which were more likely to generate 
resentment and resistance. The contemporary Security Council and 
investment regimes, like the Athenian empire, rely on common 
interests genuinely shared among states. Their legitimacy and 
efficacy largely depend on voluntary acquiescence, even if the U.N. 
counterterrorism regime relies, as did Athens, on the threat of 
military intervention. 
Today, most states, like the United States, want to deter terrorists 
and their access to WMDs. Most also want incoming foreign 
investment and want to protect their own investors going abroad, 
because many states, and not only the United States, have within 
them the modern equivalent of a “tribute-paying” class, namely 
entrepreneurs who benefit from the investment regime. The desire 
most states have for foreign capital is, in short, not merely one that is 
dictated by international bureaucrats at the IMF. At the same time, as 
the changes to the U.S. Model BIT suggest, states still want to 
protect their sovereign rights to regulate in the public interest, while 
still protecting the rights of foreign investors. 
There are potential connections between the modern international 
regimes described here, democratic self-governance and inter-state 
security; indeed, these connections existed in ancient Athens. As 
 121. Cf. Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the 
Essentialization of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723, 738 (1993) (“. . . the idea of 
international law as an ordering mechanism that draws its categories from an 
essential culture and yet stands apart from its cultural context continues to 
command considerable rhetorical power.”). 
840 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:811 
 
with the Athenian League, the investment regime highlights the 
importance and protection of private entrepreneurs; like that ancient 
League, it relies on foreign trade for both security and commerce. 
Like it, the investment regime also reproduces an international 
division of labor. To some the investment regime, along with the 
WTO’s trade regime, is an essential component of the “liberal” 
peace.122 The Security Council’s counter-terrorism regime is also 
premised on the need to protect globalization from threats posed by 
non-state actors intent on destroying or disrupting not only global 
commerce but democratic institutions.123
The global regimes for counter-terrorism and international 
investment resemble ancient empires in a more fundamental way. 
These regimes also aspire to universality. They also rely on 
sacrosanct truths that in our secular age approach the divine 
revelation that justified some ancient empires.124 In lieu of universal 
agreement on a single god or set of gods, we have placed our 
collective faith in the power of the United Nations’ collective 
security scheme and, with respect to investment, in David Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage.125 Participation and compliance 
with these regimes are, increasingly, the only options states have. 
Neither the United Nations’ collective security scheme nor the 
investment regime has a clear rival. Those few states outside their 
 122. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 239 
(2000) (suggesting that no two countries with a McDonald’s franchise have gone 
to war). 
 123. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1624, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005) 
(“Deeply concerned that incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and 
intolerance poses a serious and growing danger to the enjoyment of human rights, 
threatens the social and economic development of all States, undermines global 
stability and prosperity, and must be addressed urgently and proactively by the 
United Nations and all States, and emphasizing the need to take all necessary and 
appropriate measures in accordance with international law at the national and 
international level to protect the right to life . . . .”). 
 124. Cf. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 160-82 (2000) 
(maintaining that U.S. empire is motivated by “the extension of the internal U.S. 
constitutional project” and the promotion of independence and democracy); 
DOYLE, supra note 114, at 62-63 (including among the Athenian empire’s 
motivations for expansion a desire to spread its democracy and “way of life”). 
 125. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (introducing Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantage). Cf. United Nations Member States, List of Member 
States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (listing the 
196 countries that have ratified the U.N. Charter and are members of the United 
Nations). 
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domain, like those outside the Athenian empire, may as well be 
barbarians. Not participating in these regimes is tantamount to 
political or financial suicide.126 To be brought under the these 
regimes—to be allowed to participate in them—is to be allowed to 
enjoy the newly defined forms of “sovereignty” left to nation states, 
as it was with Athens. 127 For much of the world, these regimes 
(irrespective of their origins) are perceived as requirements of 
contemporary civilization, morally and politically justified. 
CONCLUSION 
The empires of law described here are perhaps only an application 
of Martti Koskenneimi’s insight that international law oscillates 
between utopia and state apology.128 But the empires of law 
described here are probably closest to the universalist empire based 
on the globalization of economic and cultural exchanges described 
by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their book, Empire.129 Theirs 
is a conception of empire premised on a “global market and global 
circuits of production;” a new “global order, a new logic and 
structure of rule—in short a new form of sovereignty.”130 “Empire,” 
they write, “is the political subject that effectively regulates these 
global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world.”131 
Hardt and Negri write of a post-sovereign world that “encompasses 
the spatial totality” and knows no territorial boundaries.132 Their 
version of empire joins societies across spatial political boundaries 
and makes such boundaries less relevant. 
 126. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 122, at 248 (observing that states that have the 
resources or ideology to except themselves from globalization, such as North 
Korea, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iran, are the exception). 
 127. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 
(1995) (defining contemporary sovereignty as “status,” including the ability to 
participate in international institutions). 
 128. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989). 
 129. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 124, at xiv-xv (arguing that “the rule of 
Empire operates on all registers of the social order extending down to the depths of 
the social world”); see also Susan Marks, Empire’s Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 449, 461 (2003) (asserting that globalization reconfigures political authority 
to create a new system of sovereignty). 
 130. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 124, at xi. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at xiv. 
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As Hardt and Negri indicate, empires of law reflect the fact that 
old notions of sovereignty and the exercise of sovereign power are 
no longer sufficient to describe contemporary international law.133 
These regimes have outgrown their origins. They are no longer the 
product of territorially demarcated empire—even as they enable the 
pursuit of the ideologies favored by the powerful.134 Nor are these 
regimes mere fig leafs for old-fashioned imperialist power. Even the 
United States is discovering that the shift to using legal tools and 
institutions has consequences. Some of these include unanticipated 
checks and balances on the exercise of hegemonic power, such as the 
international courts that are proliferating to check the power of the 
U.N. Security Council.135 Others, such as the new forms of 
“balancing” emerging within BITs, result from the fact that any law 
worthy of the name needs to be reciprocally applied. Whether the 
new empires of law of today will prove to be as short-lived as the 
Athenian empire remains to be seen. 
 
 133. Id. at xii (arguing that empire is not an extension of imperialism which 
worked to enrich European colonizers, but a decentralizing and deterritorializing 
force). Cf. Marks, supra note 129, at 461 (asserting that globalization creates a new 
form of sovereignty). 
 134. See Marks, supra note 129, at 461-64 (drawing comparisons between 
international lawyers’ perspectives and those by Hardt and Negri). 
 135. For a chart of international courts and tribunals, see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 404-05 (2005). 
